This paper adopts a regional and geographical approach to show how the early spread of communism to mainland Southeast Asia owes much to overseas Chinese and overland Vietnamese patterns of immigration. This wider approach seeks to get beyond the frontiers of nationalist histories and the formation of the 'modern' nation-state (whether colonial or national) in order to think in more material terms about how communism not entirely unlike Catholicism or any other religion first entered mainland Southeast Asia on the ground, by which channels, by which groups of people and at which times. The idea is to begin mapping out the introduction and spread of communism in peninsular Southeast Asia in both time and space. This, in turn, provides us with a methodologically and historically sounder basis for thinking about the 'why' of this Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary graft and the failure of this brand of communism to take hold in certain places and among certain peoples outside of China and Vietnam.
Introduction
It is well known that in the 17th century French missionaries established their Asian religious headquarters and seminary in Ayuthia in a bid to spread Catholicism eastwards to Vietnam and China. It is also now known that when it came to converting the various Buddhist kingdoms of the peninsula to Christianity, the results were anything but successful, whether among the masses down below or the kings ruling them from on high.' What is less known is that the early Asian intermediaries for the diffusion of Catholicism on the ground in the Buddhist kingdoms of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and often in the ethnically diverse highlands were Vietnamese 6migr6s (known widely today as Viet kieu). Joining them were Japanese Christian refugees and overseas Chinese immigrants (Hua qiao), concentrated mainly in the ports of the South Seas (Nanyang) englobing much of what we call 'Southeast Asia' today.' Compared to the Vietnamese, there were very few ethnic Lao, Khmer or Thai converts to or missionaries of Catholi~ism.~ Over two centuries later, Western-derived communism, like Catholicism, would also enter the Buddhist lands of Cambodia and Laos through Vietnamese channels, and not via the ethnic Lao and Khmer majority populations. In the Kingdom of Thailand, the introduction of radicalism would be shared by Chinese and Vietnamese communists working for the Comintern, the former relying on long-standing overseas Chinese communities in the port of Bangkok to spread the message, the latter preferring overland Vietnamese immigration routes running across Laos to upper northeast Thailand. Working together, in 1930 Chinese and Vietnamese internationalists led by Ho Chi Minh himself presided over formation of the Siamese and Malaya Communist Parties and a 'Laotian communist cell'. In the late 1940s, as the Chinese communist victory in China began to re-link Vietnamese communists to the world communist movement with which they had lost touch since the late 1930s, Vietnamese communists resurrected their prewar inter-nationalist contract by creating separate Laotian and Cambodian revolutibnary parties as part of a larger 'Indochinese revolution', the 'front line' of revolution in Southeast Asia.
My aim in this paper is not to compare Vietnamese Catholics and communists, whether inside or outside Vietnam. Although a provocative parallel, it is also a very misleading one? Nor am I suggesting that to be 'communist' or 'Catholic' in Asia, one had to be 'Confucian' or 'Sinicized'. This would be misleading, as the success of Christianity in the Philippines shows, the Indonesian and Indian Communist Parties demonstrate, and the terrible excesses of Cambodian radicalism have made painfully clear. Moreover, Western and Japanese colonialism was the major catalytic force pushing many Asian anticolonialists to choose communism as a way of liberating their nations.
If I evoke the intermediary role Vietnamese immigrants played in the early propagation (truyen ba) of Catholicism and communism into the peninsula, my idea is simply to try to shift us into the regional currents of Vietnamese history and to get us thinking in less political and polemical terms and in more geographical and cultural ones about how Vietnamese internationalists became-together with the Chinese-the major agents for the introduction and early spread of communism into peninsular Southeast Asia prior to the Second World War, the subject of this refle~tion.~ For if much has been written on the 'grafting' (ghip ciiy) of (international) Marxism-Leninism to the (national) 'stock' (thiin gbc) of Vietnamese patriotism," much less attention has been paid to how fervent Vietnamese internationalists served as the Asian intermediaries in the early spread of communism to Thailand, Laos and Cambodia between 1925 and 1954.7 What interests me therefore is the analytical value of a 'regional approach' extending over a longer span of time,' one that allows us to get beyond the frontiers of nationalist histories and the formation of the 'modern' itatnation (whether colonial or national) in order to think in more geographical and material terms about how communism-not entirely unlike Catholicism-first entered mainland Southeast Asia on the ground: by which channels, through which groups of people and at what times.
What I cannot consider here is the flipside of this question-that is, the why: Why did Vietnamese (and Chinese) apparently feel more at ease propagating communism into the ethnically and culturally diverse lands of peninsular Southeast Asia at the outset? Or why did communism have such a hard time recruiting non-Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries to the internationalist cause in Malaya, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand before the Second World War? Knowing how the communist message was first evangelized, in which languages or how it was indigenized or rejected by the local populations would undoubtedly throw new light on such matters.
While I evoke some of these socio-cultural factors in my conclusion, because of space limitations I concentrate in this paper on how Vietnamese revolutionaries became the leading Asian intermediaries for spreading communism into parts of the peninsula located just west of the Annamese Cordillera (Truong Son), my shorthand for the contemporary states of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. My idea is to begin mapping out the introduction and spread of communism in peninsular Southeast Asia along the geographical and material lines mentioned above. This will provide, I hope, a methodologically and historically sounder basis for a second, more socio-cultural essay on the why.
In both cases, though, I think it is important to extend our analysis over a longer span of time than we are normally accustomed to do. For the how, it might even be worthwhile to return as far back as the so-called 'precolonial period' in order to consider how ancient patterns of Sino-Vietnamese immigration across the Indochinese peninsula just may have combined to inscribe the early introduction of communism to peninsular Southeast Asia and to the western half of French Indochina in particular. Paradoxically, if official historiography in Hanoi today plays up the 'reality' of the 'special relationships' (quan he dac biet) binding revolutionary Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia, Vietnamese communists have conveniently forgotten that at the outset peninsular communism was a very Sino-Vietnamese affair . . . worth keeping in mind for revolutionary movements in the Nanyang into the 20th century. 13 Vietnamese immigration to Southeast Asia never matched these Chinese movements, neither in numbers, economic success, nor in geographical reach. Indeed, if one can truly speak of 'overseas' (hai duong) for the Chinese, in the case of 'pre-colonial' Vietnam it i perhaps more accurate to speak of overland or coastal/rive 1 immigration, movements that were much more peninsular in their scope. Two major routes in particular linked the ancient Vietnamese Kingdoms of Tonltin (Dang Ngoai) and Cochinchina (Dang Trong) to western parts of the peninsula.14 An overland one had connected Cochinchina to Lao and Thai kingdoms since at least the 17th century, if not long before. Connecting the markets of Vinh and Nakhon Phanom, this trail shuttled goods, animals, people, tribute and no doubt a few ideas across the Annamese range. It was also one of the few land routes between the more Sinicized world of Tonkin and the more Indianized and Buddhist kingdoms lying across the Ai-Lao Pass. Because of war, famine, religious persecution or better economic opportunities in the Mekong region, several thousand Vietnamese were living in villages in upper northeast Thailand by the late 19th century. Many more joined them following the French military occupation of central and northern Vietnam. However, this land trail to the Mekong was largely a Vietnamese one; given that Chinese immigration remained largely maritime and therefore concentrated in Thai coastal and port cities. 15 To the south, coastal and Cambodian river routes had long brought ~ochinchinese traders, settlers and Christians into Cambodia and Thailand, where Vietnamese quarters (ban in Thai) already existed in the 17th century. These movements in the Gulf of Thailand were probably facilitated by the larger movements of the Chinese and their regional junk trade between Canton and Ayuthia. Vietnamese Catholic fishermen, in particular, continued settling along the coast of the Gulf of Thailand-in Chantaboun, Trat, the Bangkok area and even further north along central Thailand's canals. By the early part of the 20th century, there were between 20 and 30,000 Viet kieu living in Thailand, concentrated in two major zones: 1) along the waterways stretching from the Gulf of Thailand inwards up the Chaophraya to Paknampho and Ban Dong and 2) in the present, upper northeastern Thai provinces of Sakhon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom and Udon Thani, not far from the Vietnamese provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh (see Map). There were hardly any Lao, Khmer or Thai going abroad to study Catholicism in Macao, Penang or Rome.16
Chinese and Vietnamese Revolutionary Immigration along Traditional Lines
Knowing the geography of these overseas Chinese and overland Vietnamese colonies in Southeast Asia is helpful, for once the French colonized Indochina, Vietnamese anticolonialists turned to these overseas communities for shelter, funds and external bases for retaking Vietnam from the outside, with Gia Long's reliance on southeastern Thailand in the 18th century cited as a model to follow by early anticolonialists. This was even more the case for Prince Cuong De, a direct descendant of Gia Long opposed to the French, and Phan Boi Chau, another patriotic Vietnamese hero.17 Together, these two ran the famous Dong Du (Voyage to the East) movement in Japan to train students in military arts and study Western modernization via a successful Asian importer. They were not alone: so too did Indian, Thai, Korean and Chinese nationalists, above all Sun Yat-sen whom Chau first met in Japan. Of course, Tokyo's expulsion of Phan Boi Chau's Dong Du movement in 1909 represented a major setback for Vietnamese anticolonialists, as it did for Sun. However, it simultaneously forced Phan Boi Chau to look to southern China and Thailand, in what would become a recurring strategic choice for Vietnamese circulating on the outside of Indochina over the next four decades.'' Given the troubled state of southern Chinese politics at the time, Phan Boi Chau moved the bulk of the Dong Du's students to Thailand, thanks to the tacit support of the Thai court, the chance to set u p another 'quarter' near Ban Dong in central Thailand and the large Viet kieu populations there. If I digress briefly here, my point is to underscore the importance of not letting recent problems in Sino-Vietnamese relations and modern Asian boundaries blind us to the regional, transnational character of early Vietnamese communism and its movement within these southern Chinese channels, themselves a reflection of the southern tilt of Chinese communism. This is especially the case as we return to Southeast Asia/Nanyang along Sino-Vietnamese routes. For if southern China was the CCP's and Youth League's main base at this point, changes in southern Chinese politics were-as always-going to make themselves felt in the Nanyang. More than anything else, the violent break between the GMD and the CCP in April 1927 and the violence triggered by the failed Canton Uprising at the end of that year sent thousands of Chinese (mainly Hainanese) fleeing on junks and steamers to the Nanyang countries", where many communist refugees began forming new and/or breakaway CCP branches in opposition to the GMD's older organizations. In Singapore, Chinese radicals transformed the South Seas [Nanyang] Branch Committee of the CCP into the South Seas [Nanyang] Communist Party (SSCP), whose First Congress took place in 1927. Directed by CCP headquarters now in Shanghai, the SSCP was given permission 'to gradually expand its activities to all parts of the South Seas'.33 It was in this context that CCP members either pushed out of southern China or now in opposition to the GMD in the Nanyang region tried to form entirely independent CCP branches in Saigon and Bangkok in 1927 and 1928. What attracted them most was tapping into the pre-existing Hua qiao communities and especially the growing Chinese working classes concentrated in these urban centres. However, the success of Chinese communists in Saigon in the late 1920s was less than impressive, owing to the long-standing GMD presence there and tight European surveillance. It was only in September 1938, as the Sino-Japanese war expanded into southern China, that a CCP 'section' appeared in southern Vietnam.% Nguyen Ai Quoc was obviously aware of this Chinese exodus towards Southeast Asia from 1927, since he was smuggling his own students out of Canton and on to safe bases in northeast Thailand. Caught directly in the cross-fire of Chinese civil war, on 5 May 1927, Quoc left Canton for Shanghai, Hong Kong, and then on to Vladivostock, where a member of the French Communist Party (FCP) suggested that he eventually return to Thailand via Paris to rebuild the Vietnamese movement. Quoc agreed and returned to Moscow. In November 1927, on instructions from the Comintern, he left for Paris. There, French communists helped him finalize his plans to rebuild the revolutionary movement in Indochina through the formation of an external base in Thailand. 35 As for southern China, the Youth League was in shambles, as several competing, non-communist Vietnamese 6migr6 groups gained increased GMD backing in southern China against the communists.% Coinciding with this shift from southern China to the Nanyang by Chinese and Vietnamese communists was the inter-nationalization of the Asian communist movement by the Comintern. In May 1928, the 6th Congress of the Comintern was convened. With the GMD's attack on the CCP as well as internal political concerns in mind, Stalin ordered communists in colonial areas to abandon their alliances with bourgeois nationalist parties in favour of international proletarian revolution. The French claim that during his trip to Moscow, Quoc was instructed by the Executive Central Committee of the 3rd International to form a communist party for I n d~c h i n a .~~ Before building a party, though, Comintern leaders had first to reevaluate the state of their remaining Asian bases following the GMD's crackdown. It did not take them long to understand that Quoc would have to begin his work on Indochina's western flank, in northeast Thailand.
Reinforcing Quoc's trip to Thailand was the presence among the Viet kieu in Thailand of a handful of his most trusted collaborators, trained by him in Canton and sent to Thailand following the Canton violence (Hoang Van Hoan comes to mind). Quoc arrived in Bangkok sometime in mid-1928. He then hurried to Ban Dong in Phichit province, the very one created by Phan Boi Chau's lieutenants. There, in an overseas Chinese shop, Quoc met with one of his most trusted students (also an in-law of Dang Thuc Hua). He then moved on to the main base in Udon Thani. During this time, he trained Vietnamese sent from Vietnam, transferred from Canton and recruited from among the Viet kieu. With Dang Thuc Hua's backing, Quoc took over the Dong Du's bases in Thailand by converting most of the Dang family to his revolutionary project and carefully keeping them in charge of the Thai bases. He went out of his way to win over the Viet kieu to the patriotic cause; for they were his stepping-stones leading back into Vietnam. for at the outset the SCP was a remarkably un-Thai affair and a very Sino-Vietnamese import. Of the SCP's 325 party members, most were Chinese industrial and estate workers who were said to be 'of weak quality', unable to carry out their tasks effectively. Ethnically, there were 55 Vietnamese and 20 Cantonese. The rest were H a i n a n e~e .~~ This is hardly surprising given the Comintern's proletarian line and the large Chinese working class in Bangkok. In the northeast, where there was no real working class other than a very small number of overseas Chinese and Vietnamese coolies and construction workers, the SCP was run by Vietnamese from Viet kieu communities. 'As for authentic Siamese comrades', Hoang Van Hoan tells us, 'there weren't that many' (dong chi thuc su la nguoi Xiem thi khong co may). The best recruits in the northeast, he claims, came from the offspring of Thai-Viet mixed marriages.% Revealingly, Hoan says he spent most of his time translating Chinese revolutionary tracts. Or as a November 1932 article in a Party paper summed up the SCP's major flaw:
Our party is called the Communist Party of Siam, but in truth our Party has only Chinese ... The basis by which we can change Siam comes down to a method by which we can bring Siamese into the Party. This is not a new problem. The same measure was discussed at our meeting last year . . . where we decided that the first step was for members to study Siamese in preparation for contacting Siamese. It was decided to seek results in six months, but from that time to the present it has been a year and not a single branch has announced progress. 54 Indigenizing communist parties in states in which the majority populations remained unreceptive to the communist message, or at least Sino-Vietnamese versions of it, would be a recurring problem in mainland Southeast Asia well into the postwar period. 55 The matter was even more complicated given that the internationalist projects of these Chinese and Vietnamese missionaries were simultaneously running up against emerging nationalist movements directed often against these two very ethnic groups, respectively. The Chinese encountered this problem in Malaya in the early 1930s and late 1940s, just as the My point is that by the mid-1930s, Sino-Vietnamese-filtered Western radicalism had extended itself from southern China (Canton) to northeastern Thailand (Udon Thani), to make its way into Indochina's Laotian backdoor by way of Viet kieu immigrant networks linked to central Vietnam. Given the geography of these peninsular movements, in Laos and northeast Thailand the early canalisation of communism was an ethnically Vietnamese operation. In Bangkok, it was shared with the overseas Chinese? These 'implantations' were urban-based with little contact with the indigenous masses concentrated in the countryside (see below).
The Poverty of Early Cambodian Radicalism
To the southeast, another young Vietnamese radical named Tran Van Giau hoped to use the Viet kieu concentrated in Phnom Penh and southeastern Cambodia to form a parallel ICP Cambodian Territorial Committee (Xu Uy Cao Mien). Giau had first attempted this via the Transbassac Committee, subordinate to his semi-independent Southern Indochinese Federal Committee in 1934. Unlike his Nghe-Tinh counterparts, though, Giau had no bases among the Viet kieu in southeastern Thailand and chronic, internal dissension among southern Vietnamese communists may have diverted him from expanding his work up the Cambodian Mekong as his Asian-trained colleagues were doing across the Truong Son. Second, Giau was much more interested in organizing the workers in the cities than the peasants in the countryside; therefore, any interest he had in finding a 'Cambodian working class' had to focus, again, on the Viet kieu and Hua qiao majority proletariats in Phnom Penh or the Vietnamese coolies working the rubber plantations of eastern Cambodia. Third, the fact that Tran Van Giau, a young southerner trained in France and Moscow, was always in much closer contact with the French Communist Party's (FCP) Asian liaisons and agents hooked to Saigon would not have helped in Thailand, where the FCP had few, if any, links and Tran Van Giau was largely an unknown quantity to Quoc's Canton-Udon This double evangelization among the Viet kieu was real. We know, thanks to his 1930 report to the Cornintern on the Viet kieu in Laos, that Nguyen Ai Quoc had lost 'over 1,000' Catholic supporters in Laos, when French priests threatened to refuse them communion (thong cong) if they joined Quoc's budding communist congregations.71 But our Catholic missionary had to admit that it was 'a real pain to have communist Christians' among his followers. The converse would be true, too. Interest-ingly, Nguyen Ai Quoc never went to the Thai-Cambodian border; he went further into the Nanyang. , a Special Branch report said, 'was to free the South Seas movement from the direct "central" control which was making it a purely Chinese movement'. Under the FEB, 'it was hoped that each individual state would progress along racial lines'. According to the Special Branch, the Comintern's idea in creating the FEB was to establish more direct contact with each regional country rather than relying entirely on the CCP's Nanyang networks running from Shanghai to Singapore, 'which hitherto had been the main instrument in the dissemination of communism in Eastern Colonial countries' (see a b~v e ) .~ Relying on captured SSCP archival documents, the British reported that the Comintern's failure to promote indigenous communism via CCP channels was one of the main reasons for the dispatch of Serge Lefranc (alias Ducroux) and the appropriation of 100,000 Straits dollars to reorganize the Nnnyang parties 'along racial line^'.^ In his address to the 3rd Representative Conference of the SSCP, Quoc pointed out to his Chinese listeners the need to study the Malay language and to enlist ethnic Malay recruits in the party, all the more so since there were no Malay or Indians present at Quoc's 'nationalist' transformation of the SSCP into the MCP for the 'internationalist cause'.j4
No
The irony of all this could not have been lost on Quoc. Nowhere is this better seen than in the selection of the secretary general of the MCP. In view of our discussion so far, there was clearly a logic to this choice. Not only had the Vietnamese played the key role in forming their own party in Hong Kong in early 1930, but they had also helped create the SCP, a 'Lao communist cell', the MCP and would later form the Cambodian and Laotian Communist Parties. And even more important than this Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary intersection within the MCP in Singapore was the ability of so many Vietnamese communists to circulate in southern Chinese revolutionary networks, especially in Canton, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore.
The problem was that delinking the early importation of mainland communism from its overseas Chinese and overland Vietnamese regional structures was much easier said than done. This was less because of ideological 'under-development' or 'weak nationalism' in the lands west of the Annamese Cordil-lera than the long-standing mechanics of Sino-Vietnamese immigration across the peninsula; the indispensable, transnational role of Hua qiao and Viet kieu revolutionaries in the early (internationalist) 'stock' of the Comintern's (national) 'grafts' in the Nanyang; and their related faith in international communist salvation. This, in turn, might be analysed in terms of the early Chinese and Vietnamese position as the majority working classes in the urban centres of the mainland cities during the period of colonial modernization, especially in Laos and CambodiaIn whereas the indigenous majority populations remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the countryside before 1945. There was thus little chance for these two currents to converge at the outset. Given the proletarian shift in the internationalist line in the late 1920s, the Comintern obviously had little choice but to turn to existing Vietnamese and Chinese majority working classes and ancient patterns of Sino-Vietnamese immigration to spread communism into peninsular Southeast Asian urban centres.
Vietnam, however, was in a unique position in these Nanyang revolutionary movements; for it was both an exporter of the Viet kieu workers and bureaucrats vital to the French colonial modernization of Laos and Cambodia in western Indochina and home itself to a large Hua qiao 'national minority' that was itself playing an important (and badly under-studied) modernizing role in colonial Vietnam.78 Given the Comintern's focus on urban workers, this may explain why Nguyen Ai Quoc reported to the FEB in early 1931 that of the 1,740 members of the ICP, there were 190 Chinese (11 per cent), and that of the 1,370 union workers there were 300 Chinese (18 Again, this does not mean that Lao and Khmer 'intellectuals' were somehow less 'anti-colonialist', 'poor nationalists' or 'under-revolutionary'. However disappointing the absence of 'Cantons' or 'Yen Bays' in Laotian and Cambodian historiography may be for some,s4 it might be more useful from a historical and methodological point of view to ask whether Lao and Khmer (and Malayan?) 'revolutionary' movements were flowing in other networks, with different geographies and separate goals. Moreover, it is not at all sure that Lao and Khmer 'intellectuals' remained inert during the colonial period, just waiting to be 'liberated' by the 'civilizing missions' of the Vietnamese, the Chinese, or even the French and the Thais for that matter. It all depends on where one looks. After all, during the colonial period, hundreds if not thousands of Lao and Khmer Theravada monks preferred to keep crossing that less than impermeable western Indochinese border in order to travel to Thailand. There they perfected their religious studies in scores of Thai Pagoda schools or entered into centres of higher learning for Pali and Theravada studies. It was largely because of the continued geo-cultural and religious pull of Thailand over 'western Indochina' and its Theravada minds that the French had to form their own Buddhist institutes in Laos and C a m b~d i a .~~ In this light, rather than forcing the Buddhist intellectual 'agitation' in Cambodia in the early 1940s or the 'uprisings' in southern Laos in 1936 to fit French, Russian, Western or Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary models of what is to come in the future,% we might want to ask how it was geographically, historically and culturally different. The teleologies of 'French colonial' and 'Vietnamese communist' historiographies of Indochina should not prevent us from picking up on deeper and wider historical connection^.^^ While I certainly admit that Euro-Asian police repression most certainly complicated the Comintern's internationalist success rate before the Second World War, these internal Vietnamese and Chinese documents reveal nevertheless that local cultural factors will also have to be taken into consideration in studies of the limitations of the Sino-Vietnamese diffusion of communism to the lands west of the Annamese Cordillera. Indeed, judging from the preponderant role played by the Chinese and Vietnamese in the early entry of communism to peninsular Southeast Asia, future research might explore in greater detail why communism failed to take form among the indigenous populations and elites of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaya before the Second World War and, yes, even thereafter. 88 Again, I am not saying that one had to be Confucian to be communist. Nor am I denying any Lao or Khmer the right to become a revolutionary or a communist or anything else they want to be. I am, however, suggesting that rather than analysing 'Asian' communists and communisms as if they are all one and the same, it might be worthwhile to think about how they differed. And if we should be careful not to force the link between Confucianism and communism in studying Vietnamese radicalism, we might also think twice about accepting uncritically the view that Cambodians and Laotians adopted Western radicalism in the same ways as the Vietnamese, just because Cambodian or Laotian 'parties' were eventually formed, because they all shared an oppressive 'Indochinese' colonial past, fought the French and American 'imperialists' or studied a little Marxism in France. It was surely more complicated than that once things had to work themselves out on the ground.89 After all, even after forming 'proto-Communist' parties for Laos and Cambodia in 1950-51, Indochinese communism remained an undeniably ethnic Vietnamese affair. In 1951, for example, Vietnamese communists conceded that ethnic Khmers constituted only 8.4 per cent of the Cambodian 'party' and the Laotians only made up 3.8 per cent of the Lao section.%Did Cambodians and Laotians -revolutionaries or not-truly, or at least always, conceive the ideas of power, revolution, nationalism, colonialism and communism in the same ways as Vietnamese and Chinese intellectual revolutionaries, let alone their Western counterparts? Perhaps notSg1
Methodologically, we might get at these complex questions by placing them within a wider regional perspective, such as the one outlined above, and by focusing on the people and the routes by which communism flowed into the peninsula. Such a geographically grounded debut might then better guide us in the exploration of the complicated cultural world(s) these SinoVietnamese missionaries of revolution encountered when they moved into the western half of peninsular 'Indochina', especially the Theravada lands located hardly 150 kilometres west of Hue. By combining the how and the why in this way we might grasp a little better the frustration of a ranking Vietnamese communist cadre charged with creating a Cambodian revolutionary party in 1950. In his mind, the major threat to the 'Cambodian Revolution' (Cach mang Cao-Mien) in 1950 came less from French imperialism than from a recurrent absence of Cambodian interest in Sino-Vietnamese-inspired revolution. Echoing prewar reports of failed conversions in Laos and Malaya, this ranking Vietnamese cadre in the field did not mince his words in 1950:
The Cambodian revolution must be the work of the Cambodians. If the Cambodians don't wake up, if their cadres don't know how to work, then it doesn't matter how many millions of [Vietnamese] cadres or thousands of tons of weapons and money we send them, it still won't do anything to help the Cambodian revolution.92
Indeed, it was from this point in time (and not 1945) that Vietnamese communists accelerated their efforts to propagate (truyen ba) communism among the indigenous peoples of Laos and Cambodia. Frustrated, Vietnamese 'cadres' had to turn to recruiting monks, to incorporating Buddhist icons and symbols into their propaganda and even to taking up the religious garb in a bid to convert the masses more effectively. Like French and Vietnamese Catholic missionaries long before them, the results were very limited.% But this was not just the case for these Vietnamese modernists; it was also true for those 'Western' Khmer intellectuals returning from France at this same conjunc-ture, determined to remake Cambodian society even more radically than the Vietnamese. Indeed, things got ;eally nasty when these French-trained Khmer intellectuals tried to uproot Cambodian communism from its Vietnamese networks along profoundly national lines? to remould peasant and Buddhist Cambodia in revolutionary ways not without echoes in an Angkorian past; and all this as Sino-Vietnamese internationalism came tumbling down from on high.
Admittedly, these matters, above all the why, deserve much more serious research than this. In this paper, I have tried to outline one part of a methodologically complicated question. In dealing with the how, I have suggested the possible merits of a regional approach running over a longer span of time than we are normally accustomed to; one that brings geography into the picture, allows for cultural and demographical factors, underscores possible temporal synchronisms and gets us beyond the straitjacket of fiercely nationalist and colonial historiographies without necessarily sacrificing the e've'ne~nent.~~ I have also tried to suggest the possible merits of factoring Asian variables into our analytical framework of communism in terms of how they worked themselves out on the ground and not just in revolutionary heads. The West was certainly important; but we would have an incomplete picture if we did not consider how these ideas were diffused geographically, filtered socially and adapted culturally as they moved their way through Asia. My aim is not to downgrade Western theories or advocate cultural relativism, let alone push 'Asian values' in these days of (troubled) Asian regional identity; but I think that this part of the world is just too complicated to leave the Asian regional connections out. Vietnamese communism, like its Catholic predecessor, is no exception. What remains to be examined now is how the 'evangelical message' was adopted or rejected by the local people on the ground and why.
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